THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.
MARCH 18T5.
THE LATE CIVIL WAR.
ITS EFFECT ON JURISDICTION,
RALLY.

FINCH,

LUDLOW

V.

AND ON CIVIL

RAMSEY,

AND OTHER CASES,

WASHINGTON

REMEDIES GENEUNIVERSITY

V.

REVIEWED AND NOTICED.

THAT the late civil war is to be treated as a war inter gentes,
and that it was governed by the same principles as regulate hostilities between independent powers, is a doctrine too firmly established to admit of question any longer. But, while the doctrine
has been generally recognised and applied by the federal and
state courts, cases now and then occur in which it has not been
followed, apparently, from considerations of supposed policy.
Riven and distracted as this country has been by passion, it is,
perhaps, not to be wondered at that the courts of justice have
unconsciously felt and yielded to the disturbing influences which
surrounded them, for judges are but men, after all, and a great
thinker has said that "it iA impossible for any man to escape the
pressure of surrounding opinions." But now that a cooling time
has elapsed, and passion and animosity have subsided a good deal.
we ought to be able to look at questions which grew out of tlic
late war through a much less clouded medium, and to correct and
repudiate such of our conclusions upon those questions as we find
to be distorted by feeling.
Perhaps no view of these war questions has been more misleading and pervasive than the often-repeated dogma that the belligeVOL. XXIII.-l 7
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rent rights which were enjoyed by the people of the Confederate
States found their origin in some grant or condescension on the
part of the Government of the United States. This opinion is,
no doubt, the outcome as well of an exaggerated notion of the power
of the Government of the United States, as of a natural, and, in
many instances, perhaps, unconscious reluctance to make any concession which might have a tendency to lessen the imputed criminality of the people who struggled to make firm and stable their
secession from the Union.
In his nervous and able judgment in the Prize Cases, 2 Black
667, Mr. Justice GRIER says: "1Hence the parties to a civil war
usually conede to each other belligerent riqht8." In Gappell v.
Rall, 7 Wall. 554, Mr. Justice SwAYNvE says: "Important
belligerent rights were conceded to the insurgents by the govern-ment of the nation," and in Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 200, this
learned judge lays down that "for the sake of humanity certain
belligerent rights were conceded to the insurgents in arms"' The
same doctrine has been advanced so frequently by other judges,
-state and federal, that it seems now to be generally accepted.
If this view, given forth under such high sanctions, is sound, it
follows that in a civil war the party struggling to reduce its adversary to subjection, and claiming to be its rightful government, has
power to lay down the rules which shall govern the conflict; for
nothing less than this can flow from the power to grant or withhold
belligerent rights at discretion. It is certainly a very imposing
pretension that itlay with the government at Washington to
determine whether the inhabitants of the states seceding should be

treated as traitors and felons, or as enemies, and that their escape
from the ignominy and punishment of criminals is owing entirely
to the grace and favor of that governmepmt.
It would seem that while the war was going forward, the United
States entertained no such conception of their power to rule and
direct the storm. When notified by England and France that any
attempt to close ports not under their control would be regarded
as a nullity, the United States contented themselves by resorting
to the costly and by no means effective measure of blockade. If
the government at Washington had thought it possessed the right
to seal up the ports of the seceded, or Confederate States, it is not
likely that government would have foregone a right so valuable,
and resorted to another by no means s,) efficacious. But the facts
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that England and-France gave the notification referred to, and the
United States heeded it, are quite enough to show that secession
and the establishment of the government of the Confederate
States had impaired to some extent, at least, the authority of the
United States over the states seceded ; for, in a normal condition
of things, such as existed before the war, the power of the United
States to close any of their ports would not have been disputed by
any nation. It is not, therefore, to be believed readily that the
United States would have quietly laid down the power to seal up
the Confederate ports, if any such power had existed.
The extrusion of the authority of the United States from the
seceded, or Confederate States, ipso facto suspended the operation
of the federal municipal law within those states, and it was for
that reason that the two great powers above mentioned signifibd
their purpose to treat any attempt of the United States to exercise
municipal authority in the states seceded as wholly void. In the
view of those powers and other neutral nations, the United States,
whatever might be their pretensions, bad ceased to hold sway in
those states, and in their endeavor to regain the lost jurisdiction,
could only employ such coercive measures as are allowed to
be used against independent nations. Again, if we consult the
learned and elaborate arguments and opinions delivered in the
proceedings of arbitration held at Geneva, under the Treaty
of Washington, it will be found that it is nowhere claimed
by any of the learned counsel or arbitrators that the questions at
issue were to be determined otherwise than if they had arisn
between the United States and a nation absolutely independent.
It would, no doubt, have been regarded as a reflection upon the
intelligence of the arbitrators if the counsel for the United States
had taken ground that the decision of the matters in debate could
b6 affected in any way by the policy of the United States or the
opinions held by that government as to its relations to the states
seceded. To have advanced any such argument would have
brought the case of the United States into disrepute, and
deservedly so.
It may, therefore, be said to be undeniably true that the United
States at no time assumed to deal with the late civil war in those
aspects of it which affected foreign powers otherwise than if the
contest had been between independent nationalities; and that any
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other course of action would have been a violation of the law of
nations, and resisted by the neutral maritime powers.
It remains now to inquire whether the United States had a right
to treat the people of the states seceded in itny manner not warranted by the principles of the international code governing the
relations of belligerents confessedly independent.
We shall maintain that so soon as the state of things called civil
wa.ir came into existence the powers of the government of the
United States were, to say the very least, suspended throughout the
states seceded, and that so far from its being discretionary with the
United States to determine in what way. hostilities should be
carried on, or by what rules those engaged in hostilities against
them should be judged, that government was wholly destitute of
power or discretion in the premises, and had no alternative but to
observe the rules of conduct prescribed by the jus gentium for the
government of belligerents.
When any considerable part of a nation throws off its allegiance and establishes a government for itself, to treat.the movement as criminal shocks time sense of justice of all who are not
blinded by passion ; and it is impossible to entertain any such view
of it without confounding distinctions which are well understood
and intuitively seen. It is true that when civil war breaks out
the metropolitan government, to increase its moral support, always
employs very recklessly the nomenclature of the criminal code to
characterize the acts of the people who are arrayed against it, but
this grows more out of passion than conviction; and the practice
of the metropolitan government in such cases, when contrasted
with its profession, shows strikingly the impossibility of managing
so vast a subject within the narrow confines of criminal jurisprudence. It is too plainly true, as Mr. Burke says, that the people
have no interest in disorder, and what they do to break- down
governments or disturb the existing order of things never proceeds
from a desire to attack them, but from impatience under what they
regard as bad treatment or oppression. Hence was it that Mr.
Webster, in speaking of the battle of Bunker Hill, said, "It created
at once a state of open public war. There could no longer be a
question of proceeding against individuals, as guilty of treason or
rebellion. That fearful crisis was past. The appeal vow lay to
the sword, and the only question was whether the spirit and the

resources of the people would hold out till the object should be
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accomplished." (Address at Bunker Hill.) All of us recollect that
memorable passage in Mr. Burke's speech on conciliation with
America, where in alluding to the threat of resorting to' criminal
prosecutions as a means of putting down resistance in America he
says, "At this proposition I must pause a moment. The thing
seems a great deal too big for my ideas ofjuriprudenee. It should
seem to my way of conceiving such matters. that there is a very
wide difference in reason and policy, between the inole of proceeding on their regular conduct of scattered in li,,blu ris or even 6 w,1s
of men, who disturb order within the state, AND ThE CIVIL DISSENSisos which MAY FROM TIME TO TIME, ON GREAT QUESTIONS,
AGITATE
EMPIRE.
APPLY

THE SEVERAL COMMUNITIES WITICII COMPOSE A GREAT
IT

LOOKS

TO ME TO BE

-NARROW AND

PEDANTIC

TO

HE ORDINARY IDEAS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TO TIlS GREAT

PUBLIC CONTEST.

I

DO NOT KNOW TIlE METHOD OF DRAWING UP

I cannot insult and
ridicule the feelings of millions of my fellow-creatures, as Sir
EDWARD COKE insulted one excellent individual (Sir Walter
Raleigh) at the bar. I hope I am not ripe to pass sentence on the
gravest public bodies, intrusted with magistracies of great authority
and dignity, and charged with the safety of their fellow-citizens,
upon the very same title that I am. I really think, that for wise
men this is not judicious; for sober men, not decent; for minds
tinctured with humanity, not mild and merciful."
So entirely in unison with the sentiments of Mr. Burke are
those of Bluntschli, a modern writer on international law, who
is regarded as high authority, that we cannot spare to quote his
language. He says, "The government is always prompt to declare
those who resist its authority, traitors and rebels. But when the
criminal courts have lost their power, and, de facto, war is waged
AN INDICTMENT AGAINST A WHOLE PEOPLE.

for political ends,

CRIMINAL LAW IS SILENT,

AND THE PARTIES

(See 3 Am.
Law Rev. 405, where this passage is quoted.)
It is deeply to be regretted that Mr. Chief Justice CHASE ever
committed himself to some of the sentiments contained in his
opinion in Shortridge v. Macon, 1 Abb. C. C. 58, delivered at
Raleigh. It was not worthy of his truly great mind to say that
he could see no difference between individual traitors and large
communities levying war against the United States ou political
ARE IN POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS,

enemies."
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grounds. It is something remarkable that he could not rise to
the height and dignity of the great argument, as Mr. Burke did.
The views of the Chief Justice were combated very ably by
Mr. Gerritt Smith, and we give the following extracts from his
paper discussing this question
"Had our revolutionary fathers failed, and Washington and
Franklin been hung for treason at the close of the civil war, this
opinion of the Chief Justice would cover and justify the heartr'ending ant heaven-appalling deed." * * *
"The Chief Justice asks: 'On what sound principle, then, can
we say judicially that the levying of war ceases to be treason
when the war becomes formidable?' I answer that when, in any
instance, it becomes so formidable as to induce Congress to take
it out of the jurisdiction of his court and to bring it under the
law of war, he is then bound to 'say judicially' that this is an
instance of levying war which is not treason, and with which this
court has, therefore, nothing to do." * * *
* "One reason why we should not call men traitors who are not
legally and justly chargeable with treason, is that the traitor is
looked upon as seeking personal and selfish ends, and as, therefore, worthy of our deep abhorrence. Stonewall Jitckson, killing
men to serve personal ends, and active in a rebellious movement
condemned of the people, would have been an abhorred and
detested man. But Stonewall Jackson, I arm and soul' in a public
cause-living, battling, dying for millions, is even in our eyes,
who regard that cause as a bad one, a sublime being."
We are apt to think that the law laid down by Mr. Smith will
never be weakened or overborne by the decision of the Chief
Justice in Shortridge v. M1acon.
Such being the universal sentiment of mankind, it is but reasonable to look for a reflection of it in the great international code
which, with no other sanction than right reason, governs the
nations of the (arth ; and, accordingly, we find that code in full
and complete harmony with this sentiment. So far from lending
countenance to the idea that a people who rise and attempt to
subvert governmneit on political grounds are criminals, that code,
as we shall see, treats them, for the time being, as an independent
power; refers their cause to the arbitrament of the sword, and
entitles them to employ every kind of warfare that is admissible
between nations.
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It is laid down by Vattel that "a civil war breaks the bands of
society, or, at least, suspends their force and effect ;" that it produces in the nation TWO INDEPENDENT PARTIES who consider each
other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge ;" that "those
two parties, therefore, must necessarily be considered as constituting, at least for a time, TWO SEPARATE BODIES, two DISTINCT
SOCIETIES !" that " HAVINTG NO COMMON SUPERIOR to judge
between them, they stand in PRECISELY TIIE SAME PREDICAMENT
AS TWO NATIONS WHO ENGAGE IN A CONTEST AND HAVE RECOURSE

TO ARMS ;" and that the cornmon laws of war "ought to be observed

by both parties in every civil war" (Bk. 3, ch. 18, § 293). This
clear enunciation of the great publicist received unqualified sanction and acceptance from the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, and is quoted in the judgment
in those cases.
Again, says the same high authority: "Though one of the parties may have been to blame in breaking the unity of the state
and resisting the lawful authority, they are not the less divided in
fact. Besides, who shall judge them ? Who shall pronounce on
which side the right or the wrong lies? On earth they have no
common superior." It is a noticeable fact that the passage from
Vattel next preceding is left out of the opinion of the court in the
Prize Cases, although both what goes before and follows it in the
same paragraph, i- quoted by the court. Vattel also says:
"Whenever, therefore, a numerous bndy of men think they have a
right to resist the sovereign, and feel themselves in a condition to
appeal to the sword, the war ought to be carried on by the contending parties in the same manner as by two different nations."
* * * (Bk. 3, ch. 18, § 295.)
Again says this author: " Thus
there exist in the state two separate bodies, who pretend to absolute independence, and between whom there is no judgqe. THEY
DECIDE THEIR QUARREL BY ARMS,

AS TWO DIFFERENT NATIONS

WOULD DO. The obligation to observe the common laws of war
towards each other is, therefore, absolute-indspensabbybinding
on both parties, and the same which the law of nature imposes on
all nations in transactions between state and state:" Id.
We find it laid down by Mr. Wheaton that in a civil war "the
general usage of nations regards such a war as entitling both the
contending parties to ALL the rights of war as against each other,
and even as respects neutral nations" (cited by NELSON, J., in his
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opinion in the Prize Cases, supra.) Speaking of "an insurrection of a considerable part of the state against the reigning
Prince," Burlamaqui says, " thus the government is then dissolved,
the state is actually divided into two distinct and independent
bodies, so that we are to form here the same judgment as in the
former [i. e., "as in public wars between two states, always distinct"], Vol. 2, pt. 4, ch. 7, p. 209, § xxxvi. And so entirely
international has the late war been regarded by the Supreme Court
that it has adjudged that residence and not sentiment determines
the question of enemy or not, 2 Wall. 421, and that property of a
loyal citizen residing in the adhering states sailing under the
Confederate flag without his knowledge or consent, was lawful
prize of war: The Wim. Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377.
The deduction from these authorities is that the general sentiment of mankind thdt criminality cannot be predicated of a popular movement which attains the dignity of a civil war, finds entire
support in the law of nations, and that the effect of such a movement is "to break the bands of society and government," and
to make in the nation two independent partieswho acknowledge no
common judge, and whose differences are, therefore, referred by
the jus gentium to the arbitrament of the sword; for does not
Vattel say : "They decide their quarrel by arms, as two different
nations do," and in another place, that "having no common superior to judge between them, they stand in precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest, and have recourse
to arms ?" Supra. The law of nations recognises no superior
between them. It treats them with entire impartiality. It regards
the revolted section or district as distinct and independent, for the
time being; as entitled to draw the sword in defence of its position,
and to employ all the customary means of carrying on war; and it
absolutely interdicts the metropolitan government from using any
mode of coercion which would not be allowable against an indeperident power.
If such, then, are the relations of the contending parties, it
follows, inevitably, that so long as civil war lasts the metropolitan
government has no right to exercise any sovereign power over the
revolted section or district, for the existence of any such power
would be plainly incompatible with that state of independence and
distinctness which, as we have seen, such section or district enjoys
under the jus gentium.
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:,ow the relations of the two parties to a civil war being those
of separate nations, without any common superior, their reciprocal
rights and duties are to be found only in thejus belli, which is a
part of ajus gentium.
If then a state of civil war rives a nation into two independent
parties which stand towards one another as distinct n'ationalities
having no common superior to judge between them, what handle
is there to say that either one of these parties has power to grant
or withhold belligerent rights, or to prescribe in any particular a
rule or rules for the government of hostilities? How would such
a power assort with that perfect equality on which the parties are
placed by international law, and how utterly vain and fruitless
would it be?
Regarding the parties as distinct and independent for the time
being and as acknowledging no common judge or superior, the jus
belli comes into operation and furnishes the rules by which the war
between them is to be carried on, and no more allows either of them
to make any law or decree affecting the other, than does the municipal law permit one litigant to lay down the rules by which his
suit is to be conducted. These same views were advanced in the
Federal House of Representatives in 1862, by Mr. Sheffield in the
course of the discussion of the subjects of confiscation and emancipation. The learned member said, "What are these rights of
general war ? They are fixed by the law of nations, and are a
part of our Constitution, though they may not be inodified without
the consent of other nations. Congresscannot alter or control them.
They are beyond its reach, for they govern all civilized nations,
and Congress cannot legislate but for onenation. For it to attempt
to change the law of nations would be to attempt to extend its
jurisdictionover all Christiannations. The law of nations depends
upon the well-established usages of nations, and that usage cannot
be changed but by'the consent of those whom it is to bind."
Again lie says, "These rebels have a status as a party to a civil
war, and their rights and duties are defined by the law of nations.
They have a status in England, France and in Spain. They are
acknowledged by all those nations as belligerents. And we are
bound to treat them according to the laws of war until u'e compel
their submission to our municipal authority. And if we inflict
upon them cruel, inhuman and unusual punishments, such as are
not warranted by the laws of war, it would be the right of other
VOL. XXIII.-18
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nations, who acknowledged flm as belligerents under the law of
nations, to inter7)ose and see that justice is administered between us
and them according to the lazw of nations." (Quoted in Lawrence's
Wheaton, pp. 612-13, ed. 1863.)
It is thus perceived that it is nothing less than a solecism to say
that the nietropolitan government has any power to grant or withhold belligerent rights in a state of civil war; that belligerent
rights are enjoyed by virtue of the jus gentium alone; that when
it is fitting that such rights should be enjoyed, neutral powers
have the authority to insist upon their observance; and that the
generally received opinion that the United States conceded belligerent rights to the Confederate States is unfounded and repugnant
to international law.
Having, as we would fain think, disposed of the mischievous
dogma that belligerent rights during the late war were the result
of concession by the United States, we turn now to the main subject of this article-the effect of the late civil war on jurisdiction,
and on civil remedies, generally.
It is unnecessary to adduce authority for the general proposition
that war does not, 21sofaeto, annul private debts or other contracts
between individuals. It is true that up to a period comparatively
modern some publicists maintained that war extinguished all debts
owing by the belligerents to one another. But the statement of
such a principle now-a-days would shock the moral sense by its
barbarous severity. War must from its nature be full of cruelty
and wretchedness, but the progress of civilization is not more
clearly marked by anything than by the efforts through which
mankind have, from tine to time, mitigated the rigor of war by
withdrawing from its destructiveness whatever might be spared
without impairing its effectiveness. Indeed the spirit of enlightened innovation has not been content to stop there, but, in establishing the principle that "free ships make free goods," has taken
away a valuable belligerent right, and aims to make still further
encroachments by securing to private property absolute immunity
from capture. During war the private property of each enemy in
the country of the other is as much within the protection of the law
as it ever was, subject of course, to confiscation, if hostilities should
take so harsh and unusual a turn. We sometimes hear it said that
the rights of enemies are suspended bello pendente, but there is no
suspension of them, it is the rernedie. alone that are suspended, no
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proceedings by an enemy to enforce rights being allowed. This
benign principle is beautifully, if not touchingly exemplified in the
case of the Adventure, 8 Oranch 221. While this caie was penling war broke out with Great Britain, catching in the hands of the
court a considerable fund, the property of citizens of Great
Britain. The court said this fund was in the same piedicament
as other British property found in this country when war was
declared, and that "although property of that description is liable
to be disposed of by the legislative power of the country, yet until
some act is passed upon the subject. it is still under the protection
of the law, and may be claimed after the terminationof war, if not
previously confiscated."
That an enemy has no locus standi as a plaintiff in the courts
of the country with which he is at war, is a proposition which
needs only to be stated to command assent. That an enemy can
not be proceeded against in the courts of his enemy unless he be
commorant within the jurisdiction of such courts, and, perhaps,
enjoy a license or safe conduct, is a principle too well grounded in
natural justice to admit of doubt. Of cases of the first kind
there are many in the English Reports, but of cases of the second
kind there is not one, to our knowledge; which is owing, no
doubt, to the fact that at common law personal summons or judgment of outlawry was indispensable to the vesting of jurisdiction,
and hence an English court could not, at common law, get jurisdiction of a non-resident enemy. But the introduction of the
proceeding of foreign attachment with its foundation in notice by
construction of law only, has given room for raising the question
of the liability of a non-resident enemy to be sued under that
kind of process. That such proceedings against non-resident
enemies are null and void in the eye of natural law and the law
of nations does not admit of doubt. It is to be kept in view thht
such proceedings are in no sort belligerent in their character.
They purport to be founded in notice, or, to say the very least, a
possibility of notice, else they could have no validity at any time,
but, when set on foot against an enemy, they are, in fact, carried
on in a state of public affairs which makes it absolutely illegal for
any kind of notice to be given to or received by the defendant,
and, for that reason, they are wanting in the essential condition of
a judicial act. Under the mask of judicial proceedings inter
partes to determine private rights, they are, in effect, proceedings
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of con fication in defiance of the jus gentium, which does not
allow such suits by private citizens. And they find their exact
counterpart in suits by a belligerent for confiscation in the article
that in such suits the enemy whose property is proceeded against
has no locus standi in court. His property is wrenched from him
because he is an enemy-caput lupinum-and, therefore, no citation is required. But is it not a remarkable expansion of this
belligerent right to be adjudging questions of property between
enemy citizens in circumstances where no defence can be made, and,
of course, where justice cannot be done P
To reconcile such proceedings with the humane principle of the
international code, that pending war the rights of each belligerent
in the country of the other are preserved and protected by the
law, the enjoyment or enforcement of them only being suspended,
would baffle the acutest intellect.
As we have seen, the moment a state of war comes into existence the jus belli prescribes the reciprocal rights and duties of the
belligerents. It takes effect like an act of the legislature suspending the operation of all laws and contracts, the enforcement of
which would be a violation of its provisions. Thus, working with
the effect of a repealing law, it has been adjudged that the jus
belli arrested the running of statutes of limitation of a state and
anger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; The Protector,
the United States:
9 Wall. 687; Sttwart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 509; United States v.
Wiley, Id. 508. In the case of Livingston v. Jordan, 10 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 56, Chief Justice CHAsE held at -Nisi Prius that the
late war divested the courts of South Carolina. of all jurisdiction
over persons residing in the adhering states. Ile said "the jurisdiction of the state courts over the plaintiff [a citizen of Maryland], whatever it was, terminated when the civil war broke out.
Upon that point we entertain no doubt. As between larties
residing in the state of South Carolina, and parties residing
in the states which adhered to the National Government, there
could be no jurisdiction in the courts of South Carolina
while the war continued, by which the rights of non-residents
In Brooke and others v. Filer and
could be injuriously affected."
others, 35 Ind 124, the Supreme Court of Indiana say: " We
take judicial notice that before, at, and after the rendition of the
judgment sought to be received, Virginia, one of the Confederate
States, was at war with Indiana, one of the a.'hering, or loyal
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states of- the Union. - We hold that it was error of law, the Court
having no legal power to do so, to render the judgment, and this
entitles the party to a review of it. All the authorities,without a
dissent, and they are numerous, concur in this." The same doctrine is laid down in other cases by this court: Perkins v. rogers,
35 Ind. 124; Knefel v. Williams, 30 Id. 5. In Cuyler v.
Ferrill,8 Am. Law Reg., N.. S., p. 100, the U.,S. Circuit Court
for the district of Georgia held that the war divested the jurisdiction of the courts of Georgia over citizens of the adhering
states. In the case of The Kanawha Coal Co. v. The Kanawha
and Ohio Coal Co., 7 Blatch. 391, which was upon a bill filed by
a corporation 'of Virginia to redeem a deed of trust on land in
West Virginia, which the mortgagees pretended to have foreclosed
by a sale under the deed bello pendente, Judge 1BLATCHFORD, in
his clear and able judgment, speaking of this pretended foreclosure of the plaintiffs' rights, says: " How, then, can the penalty
be enforced against them for not doing what it was unlawful for them
to do ? The proposition need only be stated to carry with it its
own answer. No such proceeding can be upheld. The remedy
for the -recovery of the debt in this case by a sale of the trust
land wag suspended during the war." Again he says: "As it
was unlawful for the debtors to pay the debt to their enemy creditor during the war, it would be subversive of the first principles of
justice to permit the creditor at the same time to enforce the payment of the debt by a sale of the land." * * * The same dootrine was held in the similar case of The Connecticut MIutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hall, 7 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 606. In the ease of
Jackson Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 6 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 732, it was
held by the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of 'Maryland
that the Maryland Statute of Limitations did not run during the
war against a Tennessee creditor. In Semmes v. _I7artford Ins.
Co., 13 Wall. 158, the Supreme Court laid down the same law.
In the leading case of Esposito v. Bow len, 7 Ell. & B1., 781-2,
it was laid down in the Exchequer Chamber that "the force of a
declaration of war is equal to that of an Act of Parliamentprohibiting intercourse with the enemy except by the Queen's license.
As an act of state, done by virtue of the prerogative exclusively
belonging to the Crown, such a declaration carries with it all the
force of law. It is founded upon the jus belli, which Lord Coke.
Co. Litt., 11 b., states to be a portion of the law of England,

THE LATE CIVIL WAR.

adding in republicd maxime eonservanda sunt jura belli." In a
word, the court lay down in this case that all contracts and proceedings which are inconsistent with a state of war are as effectually annulled or suspended as if by Act of Parliament. And in
the Milliam .Bagaley,5 Wall., the Supreme Court, referring to
the case of -Espositov. Bowden, say that a state of war operates
on a certain class 6f contracts "with a force equivalent to that Pf
an Act of Congress."

If the propositions above advanced, and supported by reason
and authority, are sound, and are binding upon our courts, which
they certainly are, if sound-for the jus gentium is a part of the
municipal law of every state-it follows necessarily, that so soon
as the late war broke out, the paramount law of war went into
operation and suspended the exercise or enforcement of every law,
jurisdiction, contract or right, the exercise or enforcement of
which would be repugnant to the institutes of thejus belli. Such
being its potency and effect it struck down the jurisdiction of all

tribunals in either section to entertain proceedings, while the war
lasted, against the inhabitants of the other in the nature of foreign
attachments or to foreclose mortgages or deeds of trust or otherw'ise;
and, in like manner, as it took away, temporarily, the commissions
of the courts in such cases, so did it suspend, for the time being,
all powers in private hands to foreclose mortgages and deeds of
trust or to inflict penalties or forfeitures for laches or defaults of any
kind imputed to non-resident enemies. And such being the undoubted law, it follows that no proceedings of the sort mentioned
which took place during the late war can be called judicial, for
they were not held in court, but CORAM NON JUDICE.
I'ut. notwithstanding this imposing array of authorities, including the case of Seemmes v. H7ar(ford Insurance Company (supra),
in which the Supreme Court of the United States laid down that
a clause in a policy of insurance, requiring suit to be brought
within twelve months after a loss, did not bar an action on the
policy brought, after the return of peace, by a citizen of Mississippi, but was annulled by the war, that learned and exalted
tribunal have in several cases held that during the late war the
jus belli operated in only one wayl-in favor of citizens of the loyal
States.
So discrepant are these cases with authority, as we humbly conceive, and so tremendous are the interests affected by them that,
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with all our deferende for the high court which decided them, we
cannot regard the principles involved in them as removed beyond
the province of discussion, and shall therefore proceed now to
notice two of these cases.
In the case of Ludlow v. Bamsey, 11 Wall. 581, the Supreme
Court have recognised as a judgment an act which, it is submitted
with the highest respect, is wanting in the pi'ime essentials of a
judicial determination. .Ramsey was resident in Knoxville, Tennessee, and the owner of valuable property there. Being disaffected to the Union cause he fled within the Confederate lines
when his state was overrun by Federal troops. In that posture of
things a creditor of his to the amount of 300 brought suit against
him in Knoxville, and attached valuable property of his there,
worth thirty times the amount of the debt. Publication in a newspaper of Knoxville was made against him ; judgment was rendered
for the debt and the property attached was sold and sacrificed.
Upon the return of peace Ramsey filed his bill against one Ludlow, who then claimed to be owner of the property, to have the
cloud upon his title, raised by the said proceedings, dissipated by
a decree denouncing the same as null, which was accordingly done;
but that decree was, on appeal, reversed by the Supreme Court,
upon the ground that Ramsey had voluntarily left "his country or
his residence for the purpose of engaging in hostilities against the
former," and could not "be permitted to complain of legal proceedings regularly prosecuted against him as an absentee, on the
ground of his inability to return or to hold communication with
the place where the proceedings were conducted."
Now conceding that Ramsey did wrong in taking refiige within
the Confederate lines, and did not become an enemy by doing so,
how did his offence supply the want of notice, actual or construe.
tive, and become the basis of a judicial act ? Is not this turning a
civil action for a debt into a proceeding to punish crime without
affording the accused a hearing? No one will contend that there
was a possibility of giving legal notice to Ramsey, and there was
-nopreten.. that his flight was to avoid service of process. The
valuable property he left behind him renders such an hypothesis
absurd. Situated as Ramsey was, the jus belli, a law paramount
to the law of Tennessee, made it illegal for him to receive notice
of any kind from the place of his late abode. The allegation that
he. wasq inside the Confederate lines unwarrantably appears to us
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to be beside the question of the validity of tile judgment against
him, fior.we maintain that no amount of criminality in such a case
can 2mnake tq for the want of notice of some kind.
For all the purposes of the case Ramsey was an enemy. So
long as a citizen of one enemy country is commorant in the country
of the other lie must be regarded by the former as an enemy, and
his property as liable to capture and condemnation: The Venus,
8 Cr. 281. It is impossible to discriminate between persons and
between property situate in an enemy's country, and all persons
and things in such a category are impressed with a hostile character. Whether an individual is properly or improperly in the
country of his enemy, the courts of his country, as we have shown,
have no *jurisdictionto render judgment against him while he is so
situated.
Up to this point we have conceded that Ramsey committed
an offence in fleeing within the Confederate lines. But was his
act criminal ? Ile was a citizen of one of the seceded states. The
sword had been drawn ; war was flagrant, and so long as hostilities
lasted the combatants were, as we have shown, separate and distinct
communities. The allegiance or obedience which Ramsey owed
the United States before the war was suspended, and he had
become subject to another government, and it cannot be viewed as
an offence against the United States that he did not suffer himself
to fall within their lines, but preferred to share the fortunes of
those who were battling for the cause he had espoused, and who,
under the law of nations, as we have seen, had a ight to battle
for that cause.
But it is in the recent case of Washinqton University v. Finch,
18 Wall. 106, that the Supreme Court have made the widest departure from well-settled principles.
That case was an attempt to set aside a foreclosure of a deed of
trust of land to secure a debt, made by a trustee under a power of
sale. The grantors in the deed, who were also the debtors, were
citizens of the county of Mecklenburg, Virgihiia, and the land was
situate in St. Louis, Missouri, where the creditor resiated. The
foreclosure was made during the war, and consequently while the
owners of the land, the debtors, on the one band, and the trustee
and the creditor on the other, were enemies of one another.
Now, in view of decisions of that high tribunal already referred
to, it is difficult to see how this foreclosure could be valid. If the
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jus belli, working with the force of an act of the legislature, suspended the running of the Statute of Limitations in a seceding
state, in favor of a creditor living in an adhering state; if it
siruck down the jurisdiction of all courts in the former states
over citizens of the latter, as we have seen it did, how could tbh
power under which the foreclosure was made be otherwise than in
suspense, so long as its exercise would be repugnant to the law
of war ?
It is said by the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the
court, "The interests of complainants in the land might have been
liable to confiscation by the government; yet we- are told that
this right of the creditor could not be enforced, nor the power of
But we respectfully submit
the trustee lawfully exercised."
that there is no similarity between a proceeding to confiscate
enemy property, and one to enforce a private right. The proceeding for confiscation is essentially a belligerent measure, and
could not be exercised at all if notice to the enemy proprietor were
necessary, and it is difficult to detect the resemblance between a
war measure of that kind, and the exercise of an ordinary power
to foreclose a deed of trust, which cannot by any process be turned
into a belligerent proceeding.
It is also said by the court in this case, that the .notice provided
for in the deed of trust was not for the benefit of the grantors
otherwise than in so far as it was an invitation to bidders. This.
appears to be a novel view of the right of the owner of the equity
of redemption. That right springs not from contract, but is given
by equity after there has been a fofeiture at law. It is allowed
by equity without stint until the act of foreclosure is consummate.
It is therefore essentially without any limitation except the will
of the mortgagee, who cannot put an end to it without giving the
debtor notice of his intention to do so. Upon this principle it is
that an ordinary pledge cannot be sold by the pledgee without
notice to the pledgor. This is an invariable principle, and applies
just/ as well to pledges which can be foreclosed without a pulwie
sale as to others. There must then be some other reason for the
rule than the one advanced by the court, that it is to promote
bidding at the sale. In deeds of trust there is generally a stipulation a§ to the notice which shall be given before foreclosure and'
that notice is for the benefit of the debtor as well as the creditor.
Again, it is said by the court that the debtor must be presumed:
VOL. XXI.1-19
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to know of his own "default" and of the liability of his property
to be sold. Now while that is very true, it only comes to this,
that the debtor knows of his so-called "default" at law; but he
does not know, nor can he possibly know, without notice, of his
creditor's purpose to foreclose his equity to redeem, which is 4
matter wholly outside the contract and under the creditor'5control.
Besides all this, the debtor cannot be conscious of any "default"
at all, for how can default be predicated of non-performance which
'is caused by a vis major P

It is said by the learned court that if the debtors had "been in
Japan," the failure to get notice of the intention to enforce the
trust would have been no ground for delay. We submit, however,
with the utmost respect, that the illustration is by no means an apt
one. If a debtor, knowing that a certain notice is required for
the foreclosure of a mortgage made by him, go to a remote point,
and is afterwards foreclosed before he can get notice of that proceeding, he has himself alone to blame. Ie should have provided
against the event before setting out on his travels. But is such a
case as that like the case of debtors who are cut off from their
creditor by sudden, and, as far as they were concerned, inevitable
-war, and who, with the money to pay their debt at command, are
forbidden by law to do so? Can there be a foundation in natural
justice for inflicting upon an innocent debtor the penalty of losing his
land in such a state of things ? Is there a Chancellor who has
ever sanctioned the foreclosure of an equity of redemption where
the debtor was fettered, and forbidden by law to redeem? In the
language of Judge BLATCHFORD, already quoted, and used in'a
case exactly like that of Washington University v. Finch: "'Row.,
then, can this penalty be enforced against them [the debtors] for
not doing what it was unlawful for them to do ? The proposition
need only be stated to carry with it its own answer. No such pro,eeding can be upheld. The remedy for the recovery of the debt
in this case, by a sale of the trust land, was suspended during the
-war:" Supra.
But it is said that MAc Veigh's Case, 11 Wall. 267, decides that
an alien enemy, non-resident, may be sued in the courts of his
enemy. It must be admitted that the law is so laid down in that
case, and that it was correctly laid down in so far as it applied to
the case in judgment, but we are satisfied that as a general prin .iple of jurisprudence,applicable to questions of private right, it
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cannot be supported. The case of Albrecht v.Sussman, 2 Yes. &
B. 323, cited by the court, was a bill for discovery and relief
filed by an alien enemy not commorant in England, and was met
by a plea of alien enemy, which was sustained. In the bill it was
averred that the defendant, Sussman, had attached certain property
of the plaintiffs in London. The bill was not to evoke a discovery
as ancillary to the suit at law, but was for both discovery and
relief. Had it been ancillary in its nature, it would have been
entertained, probably, on the authority of a then recent, and, it
would seem, unreported case in the Exchequer, which was referred
to at the bar and by the Court, in which a bill by an alien enemy
for a discovery merely, as ancillary to a suit at law, was sustained
upon the ground that it was a defensive measure. But it is a
noticeable fact that there isno account anywhere of these suits
against enemies and no warrantfor saying that they ever received
judicial countenance. In a word, the indefinite and unsatisfactory allusions which are made to these unreported cases cannot be
regarded as authority. Judge STORY, in speaking of them, says
that it isdifficult to maintain on principle that an alien enemy can
be sued, but concedes that if he can be sued, he should be allowed
to use the means necessary to make his defence effective: Eq. Pl.,
§ 53 note. The next case referred to is Dorsey v. Kyle, 30 Md.
512, 522, of which we have to say that it was overruled within a
year after it was decided by the same court as determined it, vide
34 Md. 174, Johnson and wife v. Robertson et al., and that it is a
case like Ludlow v. 1?amsey and University v. Finch, supra, and,
therefore, open to the same criticism as has been made on those
cases. But two of the authorities referred to in Ole JMeigh's case,
Clark v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, and .Russel v. Skipwith, 6 Binn.
241, throw a flood of light on this question. We shall notice only
Clark v. Morey. In that case it was laid down by KENT, 0. J.,
that an alien enemy commorant in the United States might both
sue and be sued in the courts of New York. But there is nothing
said to countenance the view that an enemy not commorant could
be sued in those courts. In the language of the court, "a lawful
residence implies protection and a capacity to sue and be sued."
The quotation from Bacon's Abridgment in the judgment in
Hfe Vezqh's case, that.as an alien enemy may be sued he may have
process to compel the attendance of his witnesses, and a discovery,
must be understood to apply to the case of an enemy resident in
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England. How different is this from the doctrine that an enemy
not coimorant may be sued and his proper~y consumed to satisfy
judgments renlred at a time when he was by law debarred from
all possibility of getting legal notice!
As we have said, the proposition that a non-resident enemy may
be sued was correct in -Ie Veigh's Case. That case was a belligerent proceeding. It was a proceeding in ren; and the only handle
MeVeigh had to contend that his property was improperly c,,ndem,,ed without his being heard was afforded by the fact that the
clfiscation laws were not levelled at all enemies, but only certain
classes of them, and that while those laws of necessity required
proceedings under themu to be conducte-l during the war, such proceedings being one of the ways of carrying on the war, they graciously permitted any enemy whose property was seized, preliuninary to confiscation, to come in and show that lie did not belong
to any of the proscribed classes, if he was fortunate enough to get
wid in time of the proceedings set on foot against his property,
otherwise, whether lie got notice or not, his property might be
wrested from him by a sentence of condemnation. The fact that
the statutes only reached the property of certain classes impliedly
gave a locus standi in juldicio to all enemies who did not fall within
those classes to resist proceedings to confiscate their property.
In M.l-iller's CJase, 11 Wall. 268, it was sought to show after the
war that Miller, whose property had been confiscated, was a loyal
citizen all the time.
But the court refused to reopen the sentence
of condemnation, notice or a possibility of notice to the owner
of the property being wholy immaterial to the validity of the
Proceeding, which was in ren and derived all its validity from the
power to make war. Of course, then, any argument from proceedings so anomalous to ordinary suits inter partes, for time ascertainment and protection of private rights, must needs be misleading and harmful.
It is with regret that we observe a very decided intimation in
the case of IFashington University v. Pine/i, that the court do not
consider the case of Tanger v. Abbott as deciding that the war
suspended the running of the statutes of limitation in the adhering states in favor of citizens of the seceded states.
In other
words, it is very pointedly thrown out in this case, that in the late
war the great principles of the jus belli were entirely one-sided in
their operation, and that the inconvenience " to citize:is of tile
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loyal states" which would flow from an impartial application of
those benign principles to both parties to the war, is a sufficient
reason for not giving the people of the "Rebel States" the benefit
of them.
As we have seen, the late war was governed by rules which riot
only were not under the control of, but which actually controlled
the United States, and it is natter for regret that since the termination of hostilities. and since the relapse of the people of the
States seceded into the predicament of citizens of the United
states, the highest and most exalted tribunal in the land has
adjudged some questions of right growing out of the war by principles of law which had no operation whenk tire events and transactions out of which those questions arose took place.
We respectfully protest that the universally received principles
of the jus belli should not be disregarded because their enforcemerit may produce inconvenience ; that the function of the courts
is jus dicere non jus dare ; and that no amount of inconvenience
can warrant a departure from the great principles referred to, and,
least of all, from that great institute of natural justice that a man
shall not be deprived of his property without an opportunity of
being heard, quia quicunque aliquid statueritparte inauditd alterd,
equum licet 8tatuerit, haud cequusfuerit.
In the case of Dorsey v. Dorsey, 30 Md. 534-5, the court say
in support of these harsh proceedings against non-resident enemies
that "a party may be sick or imprisoned in a distant land at such
place and under such circumstances that within the time limited
no notice could by any possibility reach him; but this or any other
vis major or act of God will not oust the jurisdiction of the court
over his property, once obtained by pursuing the requirements of the
statute, or defeat the title acquired under its final decree thereon."
But surely when the act of God prevents performance, as by the
death of one of the parties to a contract to marry, the failure to
perform is completely excused; and no one will question that when
the law interferes and interdicts performance of a contract, aetus
18gis is a defence. But what is a state of war but aetus legis P If
the legislature of Maryland had interdicted performance in the case
referred to, the court would have indignantly refused to enforce a
Fenalty for non-performance, and yet, tnder a nistalcen view of the
effec' of a state of war, that court did enforce a fo~feiture in a predicament of things precisely like that in the case sulqposed. In the
case of _E.posito v. Bowden, suplra, Lord Oh. B. POLLOCK interrupted
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Mr. Manisty, who was arguing to the same effect as the court in
Dorsey v. Dorsey, by saying "The case of war is an exception
implied in the contract, as the terminationof life is an exception
implied in many other contracts." It is implied in all contracts
that the prohibition or suspension of performance by the law shall
,be a sufficient excuse. This view puts the law in harmony with
natural justice, and saves it from reproach.
There are some state decisions to the same effect as Ludlow v.
!Ramsey and Washington University v. Pinch. They are collected
in a very recent Missouri case, Degiverville v. Do Jarnette, 18
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 318. The reasoning in these cases is much
the same as that empioyed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the two cases above mentioned, which makes it unnecessary for us to notice them more particularly.
It occurs to us that there is another very satisfactory ground on
which the judgments and decrees of the state courts of the
adhering states during the war, against non-resident enemies,
might be treated as nullities. We think that the exercise
of such a jurisdiction, belle flagrante, was unconstitutional.
There are some powers in the Constitution that are exclusively
vested In the federal government, some expressly so, and others
necessarily so from their very nature: Crandallv. State of Nevada,
6 Wall. 42. The power to make war would seem to come under
the latter class. It is necessarily exclusively vested in the general
government. Any concurrency of power in the states to interfere
with enemies or their property would be most mischievous in its
consequences. Such a power would be beyond the control of the
Federal government, each state being supreme within its sphere,
and the i-judged or harsh legislation of the smallest of the states
might bring down vindictive retaliation on the whole country, while
the central authority would be powerless to remove the cause of
offence. It would seem, then, to be quite clear that no step affecting enemies in their persons or estates should be allowed unless
under the sanction and by the authority of the United States
government. On this ground, if no other, the state courts referred
to were, we think, without jurisdiction in the premises during the
late war, and all their acts were void.
W. A. MAURY.
Richmond, Va.
Since the foregoing article was written, the Supreme Court of the United

States has decided the very important case of Sprott v. 7he United States, ante, p.
46, which was a petition in the Court of Claims, under the Captured and Aban-
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doned Property Act, to. recover the proceeds of certain cotton which had been
turned into the treasury.
Tile cotton was bought by the petitioner in March 1865, in Claiborne county,
Mississippi, from an agent of the Confederate Government, known to be such by
the purchaser at the time he bought, and was captured by the Federal forces ill
May 1865. On appeal from the Court of Claims, which decided adversely to the
claimant, the Supreme Court held, FIELD, J., dissentiente in omnibus, that the
alleged contract of sale was against public policy and void, the direct effect of the
transaction being to give aid and assistance to the "rebellion," and consequently
that no title whatever in the cotton passed to the claimant ; and a majority of tile
court went even further, DAVIS and CLIFFORD, JJ., dissentientibus,and laid down
that when the Confederacy was overthrown "it left no laws, no statutes, no
decrees, no authority which can give support to any contract, or any act done in
its service, or in aid of its purpose, or which contributed to protract its
existence."
Strange indeed does it seem that a government whose sanction, by the Tus gentium and the enlightened sentiment of the world, protected from the imputation
of criminality its citizens in theii" struggle to achieve a permanent independence,
had not the capacity to give title to a bale of cotton, which would be respected
after its overthrow; and we hope it will not be deemed presumptuous to say, that
in laying down that no'.Confederate sanction can amount to a juctification, the
learned court has pushed its doctrine to a dangerous length ; a length to which,
we are apt to think, it would not be carried in some cases embraced by it which
might be readily imagined, and which, it is not unlikely, will arise in consequence
of this decision. Suppose, for example, a citizen of one of the Northern States,
whose vessel was captured, belloflagrante, by a Confederate cruiser, and regularly
condemned and sold by a Confederate prize court, should assail in a Federal court
the title of an alien claiming the vessel under the decree of the Confederate
prize court, would the Federal tribunal ignore that decree and order restitution
of the vessel to the claimant ? Certainly such an order would be regarded by the
government of the injured alien as a casus beli, unless fully atoned for.
And when we consider that the United States had all the benefit which followed
upon exemption from accountability of any kind for the acts of the people of the
states seceded, and that this immunity from responsibility involved practically an
abdication of government as to the people of those states for the space of the war,
that they might assume the relation of belligerents to that people and wage war
against them, it is not apparent by what process of reasoning the United States
can claim that their laws or their policy were in force within tile
limits of the
Confederacy during the time they repudiated the responsibility of government as to
the people of the Confederacy. Indeed the course of the United States in this particular would seem to estop their courts from setting up the pretension that tile
laws or policy of the United States had any operation in the states seceded during
the war. We are aware that the case of Rose v.lim[ely, 4 Cranch 241, is often
referred to as authority for the proposition, that in a civil war there may be a coexistence of rights of sovereignty and belligerent rights. But a slight examination of that case will show that no such question was involved in it, and that what
was said by the Chief Justice on that subject was argunienti gratd merely, and is
not to be attributed to the court, none of whom seems to have concurred in any
part of the Chief Justice's opinion, except the conclusion which he reached, that
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the sentence of the court below should he reversed. The case grew out of a violation of a decree of the French government torbidding intercourse with any part
of thc i-land of St. D)omingo il tile possession of' the negro iniurgents ; but, as a
majority of the Supreme Court was of opinion that the seizure and codenation
of the cargo in question were illegal and void upon grounds which did not involve
the validity of the decre-two of tite judges regarding tie seizure as unwarranted
because made on the high seas and outside the territorial limits of St. Domingo,
and three of the judges regarding the conIenialon as invalid because the property
sought to be affected by it was lying in a neutral port at the time the court of St.
)omingo pronoudeed it. If, however, the validity of the decree ia been a point
in judgment in this case, tile court must, under the circumstances, have upheld it.
The executive department of the government, to which is committed the subject
of our foreign relations, had acquiesced in tite decree, and thus recognised the
authority of France to exercise rights of sovereignty over the whole island of St.
Domingo, and this acquiescence of the executive would have been conclusive upon
tile Supreme Court. The truth is, tile tegroes of St. Domingo had shocked the
world b their revolting crueties, and were looked upon as outlaws. In his
opinion in tie above ease, the Chief Justice calls them "brigands." And, surely,
precedents growing out of a war with such barbarian4 cannot always be appealed
to for tite elucidation of questions arising from our civil war.
Nowhere have we seen the law touching the validity of acts done by the Confederate government as satisfactorily or as ably hai down as it is by Judge ST AP1XB,
delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in the ease of Newton's Ex'or v. B]nshong, 22 Graft. 628. That learned judge helt, with a force
of reasoning which is irresistible, that a payment of money made under the decree
of a Confederate court of sequestration, was a valid discharge as to a citizen of it
loyal state, to whom the money was due at the time it was sequestered. We are
gratfied also to find that sonic of the views advanced by us in the article preceding
this note, are ably supported by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the case of
Smith v. lBrazelton, 1 Heiskell 44, which we did not see until after our article was
written and had passed out of our bands.
In our view, looking as we do to the transcendent importance of protecting the
Supreme Court of the United States from any suspicion or imputation of sectionalism, it is much to lie deplored that this high and learned tribunal has made decisions of questions growing out of the civil war which it is utterly impossible for
the courts of Virginia and some .other Southern States to follow. The case
of Horn v. Lockh'art, 17 Wall. 570,-in which an investment, honestly made, by
an executor in Confederate bonds, under a judicial sanction, was held illegal
hy applying to tite case laws and a policy which had no force or operation where
tile investment was made-could not be followed in the South without carrying
ruin to the hearthstones of many honest fiduciaries, who did what prudent men
were doing around them, and whose only fault was not to be wiser than the men
of their day and generation.
Perhaps, if the Bar hatl pressed upon the Supreme Court, from the first, the
views which we have very imperfectly presented, instead of making the mi. chievous concession that it lay with tite United States government to grant or
withhold belligerent rights it, tite late war, that learned tribunal might have
reached different ctnclusions, and we shouhl then have been spared tite pain
of seeing some of tite state courts and tite Federal cottrts in htopeless conflict on
questions of the profounle.,t interest and importance.

